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The Microfoundations of Diversionary Conflict
Tobias Theiler
ABSTRACT
Diversionary conflict theorists assert that leaders can become
more popular at home by pursuing conflict abroad. At first glance
this claim appears counterintuitive in light of the hardship conflict
often imposes on ordinary citizens. Relying on social identity
theory (SIT), I deduce two hypotheses to help explain why conflict
can increase popular support for leaders. First, conflict with an
outgroup can make people identify more strongly with their
ingroup. Second, stronger ingroup identification can lead to
increased support for leaders inside the group. The second part of
the article applies these two hypotheses to Russia’s seizure of
Crimea in early 2014. Attitude surveys show that the Crimea
conflict increased national pride among Russians while support
for President Vladimir Putin rose dramatically, and they suggest
that the two processes were causally linked. These findings
support the article’s two hypotheses.
The Microfoundations of Diversionary Conflict
Diversionary conflict1 theorists assert that leaders can become more popular at
home by pursuing conflict abroad. Consequently, they expect leaders to become
more inclined to start conflicts when their domestic position comes under threat.
A flourishing body of scholarship in the diversionary conflict tradition uses this
logic to explain many different conflicts and instances of bellicose behavior by gov-
ernments. These range from the Argentine military junta’s invasion of the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands and President Ronald Reagan’s military intervention in
Grenada to Iran’s nuclear program and President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of
Crimea.2
Tobias Theiler is a lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College
Dublin.
1I use the term “diversionary conflict” rather than the less inclusive concept of “diversionary war.” The former denotes
external belligerence pursued by a leader or regime with the primary aim of strengthening his, her, or its hold on
power. This may, but does not necessarily have to, lead to full-scale war.
2John A. Tures, “Rattling the Hesam: International Distractions from Internal Problems in Iran,” Asian Politics & Policy 1,
no. 1 (January/March 2009): 50–78; Amy Oakes, Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), chap. 1; Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the
Falkland Islands,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 431–63; Stephen Sestanovich, “Could It Have
Been Otherwise?” American Interest 10, no. 5 (April 2015): 6–15; Michael McFaul, “Moscow’s Choice,” Foreign Affairs
93, no. 6 (November/December 2014): 167–71.
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Yet the claim that conflict makes citizens rally behind their leader is far from
intuitively obvious. After all, conflict and its consequences tend to confront most
ordinary citizens with danger, cost, and hardship that outweigh the benefits they
individually stand to gain. If the conflict leads to their country’s full-scale military
defeat these costs can be catastrophic. Yet even conflicts that end in victory or stay
short of physical violence can be risky and costly to average citizens. Even if Russia
seizes more of eastern Ukraine or Iran succeeds in building a nuclear bomb, the
material welfare and physical security of ordinary Russians and Iranians on aver-
age will likely have suffered, not benefited, as a result: depressed by economic sanc-
tions, currency collapses, and toughened travel restrictions, not to mention a latent
risk of becoming caught up in some form of eventual military showdown. If one
assumes (1) that conflict typically brings more risks than benefits to ordinary citi-
zens; and (2) that most people do not consciously behave in ways that risk
compromising their material welfare and physical security, one would prima facie
expect conflictual leaders to lose rather than gain popular support. Put differently,
while diversionary conflict theorists view elites as perceptive, rationally calculating,
and self-serving manipulators ready to start conflicts in an attempt to stay in
power, they conceptualize mass publics in diametrically opposite terms, as prone
to “respond to symbolic politics rather than their real interests. It is not clear, how-
ever, why elites, but not the mass public, are driven by their private material or
political interests. Why do elites give priority to their domestic political interests,
whereas others… are so easily seduced… ?”3
This article develops a rationale for the claim that external conflict can make
people rally behind their leader, and it deduces the conditions under which this is
most likely to occur. It does this by drawing on social identity theory (SIT). In the
analysis of nationalism, ethnic conflict, social discrimination, and related phenom-
ena, SIT is widely used.4 Among international relations scholars, too, SIT has
received growing attention in several contexts.5 By contrast, the diversionary con-
flict literature has not so far systematically engaged with it. From SIT I deduce two
hypotheses: (1) conflict with an outgroup can cause people to identify more
strongly with their ingroup; and (2) stronger ingroup attachments can lead to
increased support for leaders inside the group. The second part of the article
3Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 280.
4Leonie Huddy, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory,” Political Psychology
22, no. 1 (March 2001): 127–56; Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theories:
A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December
1995): 255–69.
5Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?” European Jour-
nal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (June 2005): 235–65; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status
Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95. Tobias
Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (April 2003): 249–68;
Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 229–52. Explanations for
ethnic conflict, too, have increasingly incorporated insights from SIT, often in combination with other approaches,
such as symbolic politics theory. See Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2001).
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applies these hypotheses to Russia’s seizure of Crimea in early 2014. Attitude sur-
veys show that the Crimea conflict boosted national pride among Russians while
support for President Putin rose dramatically, and they imply that the two pro-
cesses were causally linked. These findings support the article’s two hypotheses.
Conflict and Support for Leaders
Conscious of the questions it raises, diversionary conflict theorists have sought to
corroborate their claim that conflict can strengthen popular support for leaders in
three main (potentially overlapping) ways. According to the first explanation, con-
flict can benefit struggling leaders by distracting their publics from domestic prob-
lems and/or by allowing them to demonstrate their supposed competence and
decisiveness. Even where this effect is relatively short-lived, it might allow a leader
to weather a temporary crisis at home.6 A second explanation builds on the obser-
vation that diversionary leaders often pursue conflicts they can portray to their
constituents as delivering tangible benefits, for instance by claiming that a preemp-
tive attack is necessary to stop the target state becoming an unmanageable threat
in the future.7 Where citizens accept such justifications, and because of this sup-
port a belligerent leader, such support derives from utilitarian means–ends calcula-
tions focusing on the expected outcome of the conflict rather than from the
experience of conflict as in the first explanation. The third explanation draws on
the classic conflict–cohesion hypothesis developed by sociologists, including Emile
Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and Lewis A. Coser.8 It purports that conflict with an
outgroup increases people’s commitment to their ingroup and that this translates
into support for group leaders.9 This explanation thus focuses once again on peo-
ple’s experience of conflict (rather than on how they anticipate its outcome) but
asserts that this experience stimulates more deeply rooted processes of social iden-
tification beyond mere “distraction” effects. The group identities strengthened
through conflict may endure long after the conflict itself is over.
None of these three accounts fully corroborates the diversionary conflict theo-
rists’ claim that conflict can make people rally behind their leaders. The problem
with the first two explanations is not that they are necessarily wrong but rather
that they already presuppose what diversionary conflict theorists need to explain.
6See George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal–Agent
Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (May 1994): 362–80.
7Sung Chul Jung, “Foreign Targets and Diversionary Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September
2014): 566–78.
8See Christopher Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 2 (April 1997): 259; Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversion-
ary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 5 (October 2008): 641–64;”
David Sobek, “Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time,” Journal of Peace Research 44,
no. 1 (2007): 31; Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War.” For a dated but useful overview of the early conflict–cohe-
sion literature, see Arthur A. Stein “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
20, no. 1 (March 1976): 143–72.
9For example, Emile Durkheim famously singles out “great popular wars” as reducing the rate of suicide as they divert
people’s concerns toward the plight of the group. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe, IL: Free
Press, 1951 [1897]), 208.
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As for the first explanation, it assumes that citizens are attracted to conflict without
justifying why this is supposedly so. If citizens were not already receptive to being
mobilized for external belligerence, leaders would lose rather than gain support by
using such belligerence as a “distraction” device. The second explanation faces a
similar problem. Even if citizens believe their diversionary leader’s (disingenuous)
claim that a conflict he or she has started is in the national interest, it is not clear
why they should wish to prioritize such collective aims over their individual wel-
fare and security that the conflict endangers. This explanation, too, therefore leaves
the central puzzle unsolved and brings us back to the original question.
The conflict–cohesion-based explanation, by contrast, appears to offer a path to
understanding people’s underlying motivations. Not only does the conflict–cohe-
sion claim enjoy relatively solid empirical backing,10 but since international con-
flict is quintessentially an intergroup phenomenon it seems plausible to assume
that it affects people’s political attitudes somehow “through” their groups. None-
theless, reflecting the diversity of their analytical backgrounds and empirical con-
cerns, sociological conflict–cohesion theorists continue to debate the same
questions that diversionary conflict theorists also need to address. Critically, these
include the questions of why and when groups matter to people in the first place
and, by extension, how different scope conditions (pertaining to different kinds of
conflicts, political systems, ingroups and outgroups, etc.) might mediate the effect
of conflict on people’s relationship with their groups.11 Second, the conflict–cohe-
sion claim could conceivably support the diversionary conflict hypothesis only if it
were shown in a second theoretical step that increased group cohesion engenders
greater support for group leaders.12 Several analysts suspect such a causal relation-
ship in different contexts and from various perspectives,13 but this, too, might eas-
ily seem counterintuitive. If conflict–cohesion theorists are correct in arguing that
conflict makes people value their group more strongly but at the same time puts
that group at greater risk, should one not expect group members to reign in and
punish leaders whose behavior exposes the group to these risks rather than reward
them with more support?
Adopting the conflict–cohesion approach as a theoretical starting point, the fol-
lowing sections seek to address: (1) how and when conflict can increase people’s
commitment to their groups; and (2) how and when this can strengthen support
for group leaders. To account for both processes I turn to social identity theory, a
10Stephen Benard, “Cohesion from Conflict: Does Intergroup Conflict Motivate Intragroup Norm Enforcement and Sup-
port for Centralized Leadership?” Social Psychology Quarterly 75, no. 2 (May 2012): 107–30.
11Stephen Benard and Long Doan, “The Conflict–Cohesion Hypothesis: Past, Present, and Possible Futures,”
in Advances in Group Processes, vol. 28, ed. Shane R. Thye and Edward J. Lawler (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publish-
ing, 2011), 189–225.
12Some conflict–cohesion theorists argued the other way round, postulating that conflict can promote group cohesion
only if strong leaders mediate its effect. By contrast, some later theorists do draw a tentative link between group
cohesion and support for leaders. See Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion,” 148; Benard, “Cohesion from Conflict.”
13Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” International Organi-
zation 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 299; V. P. Gagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of
Serbia,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 133; Benard, “Cohesion from Conflict.”
4 T. THEILER
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e D
ub
lin
] a
t 0
6:2
0 2
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
social-psychological approach conceived around the question of how relations
between groups and developments inside them affect each other.
Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory asserts that people have an intrinsic need to form groups and
to identify with them, and that this influences how they perceive and act inside
groups and across group boundaries. Central to SIT is the phenomenon of catego-
rization, which stems from our quest for cognitive parsimony in a world that is
inherently fluid and ambiguous. In order to reduce this complexity we divide our
social and physical environment into categories, overestimating both the similarity
of items placed in the same category and their difference from items placed in
other categories. By categorizing others and ourselves we generate human catego-
ries; by internalizing these categories and our membership in them we turn these
into groups, defined as bounded human collectivities that attract the identifications
of their members and influence their cognitions, emotions, and actions.14 Inside
groups, their members to various degrees conform to what SIT terms the “group
prototype,” that is, the norms and practices through which group members define
their group and distinguish it from other groups—shared conceptions of “what it
means to be” Russian, Irish, or a Rotarian.15 For their part, relations between
groups are often influenced by social comparison, as group members form judg-
ments about their ingroups’ qualities and relative status by comparing them
against relevant outgroups. Being self-esteem seekers overall, we tend to compare
our ingroups to outgroups along dimensions that reflect favorably upon our
ingroups (and thus upon ourselves) and, by implication, less favorably upon
outgroups.
Groups and Emotions
Implicit in this brief sketch is that SIT treats groups as partially constitutive of our
cognitions (how we apprehend and categorize the world) and of our emotions
(how we feel toward the world). Since SIT was first developed, the emotional
aspects of group identification have received increasing attention and helped
spawn several theoretical offshoots, notably intergroup emotions theory.16 Based
on SIT’s conceptualization of groups as internalized social categories, intergroup
emotions theorists assume that groups, too, can be objects of emotions. Just as at
the (inter)individual level our emotions derive from how we appraise people,
objects, and events and their meaning for us personally, so at the (inter)group level
14Michael Billig and Henri Tajfel, “Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour,” European Journal of
Social Psychology 3, no. 1 (January/March 1973): 27–52; Hogg, Terry and White, “A Tale of Two Theories”; Michael A.
Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes
(London: Routledge, 1998).
15Hogg and Abrams, Social Identifications, 21.
16Eliot R. Smith and Diane M. Mackie, “Dynamics of Group-Based Emotions: Insights from Intergroup Emotions Theory,”
Emotion Review 7, no. 4 (October 2015): 349–354.
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“people appraise ongoing events based on [their] relevance to the extended self (the
social group) … and respond to them with corresponding emotions.”17 Accord-
ingly, we may feel proud, angry, embarrassed, sad, or insulted because of some-
thing that affects a group with which we identify, such as the football team we
support winning, our nation being insulted, or our gender suffering discrimination.
We may experience these group-based emotions even if we are not directly affected
by the events that give rise to them.18 In line with SIT’s basic premises, the strength
of our group-based emotions depends in part on the strength of the relevant group
identity.19 The more deeply we have internalized a group, the more we feel “as” the
group and appraise objects and events in terms of their significance for the group.
The next section builds on the role of groups as objects of emotion. It models
how conflict with outgroups can cause people to identify more strongly with their
ingroups and to experience group-based emotions more intensely—positive emo-
tions related to the ingroup as well as negative emotions related to the outgroup.
The subsequent section charts how group leaders can act as “entrepreneurs of
emotion” by channeling positive ingroup emotions toward themselves.20
Conflict and Group Identification
According to SIT, groups’ ongoing efforts to derive status by comparing them-
selves against other groups often leads to competition but not necessarily to aggres-
sion or even violence.21 Pacified Western Europe, among other examples,
illustrates that social comparison and status competition between states and socie-
ties can be entirely peaceful. Yet SIT suggests that where full-scale conflict does
break out, it can rally people to the defense of their groups and thereby strengthen
their identification with these groups and their experience of group-based emo-
tions. For social identity theorists, an important determining factor of how strongly
we identify with a group is the group’s salience to us, which in part reflects the fre-
quency and intensity with which we experience the group and become conscious
17Ibid., 350. See also Stephen Reicher, Russell Spears, and S. Alexander Haslam, “The Social Identity Approach in Social
Psychology,” in The SAGE Handbook of Identities, ed. Margaret Wetherell and Chandra Talpade Mohanty (London:
Sage, 2010), 56; Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith, “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive
Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (October 2000):
603.
18See Jonathan Mercer, “Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity,” International Theory 6, no. 3 (November
2014): 515–35.
19For example, the more strongly Americans identify with the group category “American,” the angrier and more fearful
they feel about actual and potential terrorist attacks against the United States and the more vehemently they favor
action against those responsible. Diane M. Mackie and Eliot Smith, “It’s About Time: Intergroup Emotions as Time-
Dependent Phenomena,” in Social Identities: Motivational, Emotional and Cultural Influences, ed. Rupert Brown and
Dora Capozza, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 174, et seq.; also see Brent E. Sasley “Theorizing States’ Emotions,” Interna-
tional Studies Review 13, no 3 (September 2011): 452–76.
20Reicher, Spears, and Haslam, “The Social Identity Approach,” 58.
21Determining factors include the nature of the objects over which groups compete and their importance for the
groups’ perceived status. Marilynn B. Brewer, “Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict: When Does Ingroup
Love Become Outgroup Hate?” in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, ed. Richard D. Ashmore,
Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17–41. Applied to international relations, see
Welch Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers;” Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity–Conflict Debate.”
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of its defining norms, its boundaries, and our membership in it. Conflict is a pow-
erful driver of group salience. By placing a group’s status or even its survival at
risk, conflict (and especially violent conflict) can commit group members to an
intense communal and community-affirming effort that defines their self- and
other-understandings in terms of their contribution to the group. As they experi-
ence one another working, sacrificing, and fearing for their group, its members
affirm their communality at the inside and shared difference from the outside,
each subjectively magnified by its contrast with the other. Their experience of
group-related emotions intensifies, while other social categories to which they
simultaneously belong (temporarily) recede into the background. Increasingly,
group members perceive in- and outgroup members alike in group-stereotypical
terms, which both stems from and further reinforces the group’s importance to
them.22 “The more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the
individuals who are members of the opposite groups will behave toward each other
as a function of their respective group memberships, rather than in terms of their
individual characteristics or interindividual relationships.”23
If conflict can increase our attachment to a group while our willingness to
defend the group depends in part on the strength of this attachment, the relation-
ship between intergroup conflict and ingroup identification can become reciprocal
and drive escalating conflictual spirals that characterize many real-world con-
flicts.24 In the present context, however, the critical causal link is from conflict to
group identification. SIT’s conceptualization of groups as internalized social cate-
gories and objects of emotions helps explain why people are willing to sacrifice for
their groups and how intergroup conflict can make them identify more strongly
with their groups. This link between conflict and group identification is subject to
various scope conditions that I further discuss below. Before doing so, I turn to the
second question posed at the outset: if conflict causes people to identify more
strongly with their group, how can this rally support for group leaders? SIT sug-
gests two mutually compatible processes.
Group Identification and Support for Group Leaders
The first process is a straightforward extension of the conflict–cohesion logic just
outlined. If conflict with outgroups makes people more committed to their
ingroups, it will also strengthen support for group leaders provided their
22More generally, SIT concurs with many sociologists and social anthropologists in assuming that interaction with out-
groups can strengthen ingroup identifications. See Fredrik Barth’s seminal “Introduction,” in Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference, ed. Fredrik Barth (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget,
1969): 9–38.
23Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup Rela-
tions, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1986), 7–24; for a critical application
to modern nationalism, see Sinisa Malesevic, “Nationalism, War and Social Cohesion,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34,
no. 1 (January 2011): 142–61.
24See Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Identity.”
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constituents consider them effective defenders of the group.25 Yet belligerent lead-
ers who rely on this support-generating logic alone remain vulnerable to competi-
tor elites who seek to turn it to their own advantage by accusing the incumbent of
weakness or betrayal and demanding even more ferocious action against the out-
group. The ethnic conflict literature describes this as “ethnic outbidding,”26 but
interstate conflicts, too, can unleash such internal contests. They can leave belliger-
ent leaders torn between trying to appease increasingly radicalized domestic com-
petitors while seeking to limit the damage this does to their standing with more
moderate internal constituents and the wider outside world. Former Serb leader
Slobodan Milosevic’s predicament during Serbia’s wars against its neighbors in the
1990s is a good example of a diversionary leader squeezed between more moderate
forces and radicalized competitors calling for an even more uncompromising
stance against outgroups.27
Second, group leaders may benefit from increasing group identification among
their constituents by virtue of one of the most fundamental mechanisms postulated
by SIT as previously discussed: when identification with a group intensifies, attach-
ment to that group’s defining norms and symbols also grows. Strengthening group
identification therefore can boost support for leaders and hierarchies inside the
group provided these have appropriated group-defining norms and symbols,
approximating what Johann P. Arnason describes as a “symbolic fusion” of politi-
cal power with social identifications.28 In such a sociopolitical setting, the norms
and symbols that represent a group also represent the group’s leader with the two
dimensions drawing on strongly overlapping symbolic vocabularies. In SIT termi-
nology, to the extent that a leader embodies the group prototype, attachment to
the group equates with attachment to the leader. As the group’s sway over its mem-
bers strengthens, the leader’s position ipso facto consolidates.
Support that emerges through this second process is harder to usurp by internal
competitor elites. For it arises not because group members consider their leader
simply a means to defend the group (as in the first scenario) but rather see him or
her as the group’s embodiment and personification and thus value the leader in
the same way they value the group itself: intrinsically rather than just instrumen-
tally. Where “the leader constructs him- or herself as the embodiment of the
ingroup … anything the leader says or does by definition encapsulates the group
identity and anyone who opposes the leader by definition becomes an opponent of
the group.”29
25Benard, “Cohesion from Conflict.”
26Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 434.
27Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992).
28Johann P. Arnason, “The Theory of Modernity and the Problematic of Democracy,” in Between Totalitarianism and
Postmodernity: A Thesis Eleven Reader, ed. Peter Beilharz, Gillian Robinson, and John F. Rundell (Boston, MA: MIT
Press, 1992), 51.
29Stephen Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, and Nick Hopkins, “Social Identity and the Dynamics of Leadership: Leaders
and Followers as Collaborative Agents in the Transformation of Social Reality,” Leadership Quarterly 16, no. 4 (August
2005): 564.
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The extent to which leaders become “fused” to their groups in turn depends in
part on the political system in which they operate. It is a hallmark of many author-
itarian systems that they seek to infuse norms, symbols, and rituals signifying the
group with those representing the leader. At the extreme end of the authoritarian
spectrum from this perspective are systems in which power and its symbolic mani-
festations are highly personified and the leader’s attempts to appropriate symbols
of national identity and communal belonging are correspondingly intense—take
the omnipresent cult of the leader and its interwovenness with nationalist group
imagery that itself is fashioned in the leader’s image in the likes of Turkmenistan
and North Korea.30 How a regime’s subjects respond to such efforts needs to be
established in any given instance. Overall, however, findings by some researchers
that highly personalized “strongman” regimes are more likely than other authori-
tarian governments to react to domestic turmoil with external belligerence square
with such an account.31 That same logic would also seem to explain why a slide
towards more personalized leadership styles in (semi)authoritarian and semidemo-
cratic systems often goes hand-in-hand with more confrontational policies towards
the outside world and/or internal minorities—Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and Rob-
ert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe are relevant examples, as is Putin’s Russia, to which I will
return below.
Democracies by contrast differ from autocracies, among other things, in that
they typically separate more strongly between the day-to-day exercise of political
power and symbols of national communal belonging. This separation helps insu-
late national identifications from frequent changes of political personnel. However,
as with authoritarian systems, here, too, different subtypes have different charac-
teristics. The separation between political decision makers and communal symbols
is typically strongest in parliamentary systems where the nation’s embodiment and
personification falls to constitutional monarchs or presidents with little political
power. By contrast, in (semi)presidential democracies that (partially) merge the
roles of political chief executive and symbolic head of state, the exercise of political
power may be deeply embedded in symbols and rituals that for their part also serve
as communal identity markers. Compare the prosaic daily functioning of British
and Dutch prime ministers with the symbolically highly charged and ritualized
presidential role in the United States and some similar systems.
Diversionary conflict theorists have not systematically separated between differ-
ent democratic systems from that perspective. Yet the argument in this section
accords with findings that struggling presidents in presidential democracies overall
are more likely to use military force abroad than floundering leaders of coalition
30See the contributions in John Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994); Jan Sır, “Cult of Personality in Monumental Art and Architecture: The Case of Post-Soviet
Turkmenistan,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 25 (2008): 203–20.
31Olga Chyzh, Brian Lai, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Autocratic Regimes and Diversionary Uses of Force” (working
paper, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, n.d.); for contradictory findings, see Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisan-
gani, “Diversionary Despots? Comparing Autocracies’ Propensities to Use and to Benefit from Military Force,” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 477–93.
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governments in parliamentary systems.32 This discrepancy exists even though lead-
ers in both settings tend to face powerful veto players that make it hard for them to
remedy the crisis at hand through domestic reforms while they enjoy a compara-
tively freer hand abroad. Following the argument in this section, one reason for
this difference in outcome might be that, compared to leaders of coalition govern-
ments, presidents in presidential democracies have a greater incentive to choose
external conflict given that they stand to reap particularly strong popularity gains
as a result.
Scope Conditions
The argument so far offers a basic rationale for the conflict–cohesion and the
diversionary conflict propositions respectively. It shows (1) that conflict can make
people identify more strongly with their groups; and (2) that stronger group identi-
fication can increase attachment to group leaders. Yet the strength of both pro-
cesses depends on several factors beyond the type of political system in which
leaders operate. The first process depends in part on how ingroup members per-
ceive the outgroup that is being targeted by the belligerent leader, and how the
leader and his or her domestic allies frame such perceptions. The second process
partially depends on how leaders position themselves domestically in relation to
the conflict. The following two subsections discuss these in turn.
Perceptions and Framing of the Outgroup
For a conflict to increase people’s attachments to their ingroup, they must have
become mobilized in support of that conflict. In turn, for mobilization to occur
they must hold negative feelings toward the relevant outgroup. Such emotions can
include hatred, disdain, distrust, a desire for revenge, feelings of humiliation, vic-
timization and of being threatened and, most of all, anger.33 As conceptualized by
SIT and intergroup emotions theory discussed earlier, such emotions are group-
based and mostly derive from stereotypical representations of the outgroup.
32Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, “Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force: Regime Types and the
Use of Benevolent and Hostile Military Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 6 (September 2011): 1021–46.
David J. Brule and Laron K. Williams find that as the number of coalition partners increases coalition governments
become less likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies, but that minority governments and those facing weak party
cohesion are more likely to do so. Ryan K. Beasley and Juliet Kaarboo, by contrast, find that coalition governments
become more drawn towards aggressive foreign policies as the number of coalition partners increases but agree
that fragile parliamentary support is a further predictor. David J. Brule and Laron K. Williams, “Democracy and Diver-
sion: Government Arrangements, the Economy, and Dispute Initiation,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 6 (Novem-
ber 2009): 792–94. Ryan K. Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo, “Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary
Democracies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December 2014): 729–40.
33Violet Cheung-Blunden and Bill Blunden, “The Emotional Construal of War: Anger, Fear, and Other Negative Emo-
tions,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 14, no. 2 (April 2008): 123–50. Also see Emma Hutchison and
Roland Bleiker, “Theorizing Emotions in World Politics,” International Theory 6, no. 3 (November 2014), 507–8. On
the role of humiliation, see Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the
Scramble for Africa,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 (July–September 2016): 385–419; on revenge, see Lloyd Cox and Steve
Wood “‘Got him’: Revenge, Emotions, and the Killing of Osama bin Laden,” Review of International Studies 43, no. 1
(January 2017): 112–29.
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Consequently, leaders are often able to manipulate such emotions through propa-
ganda campaigns and other means. Yet even where leaders manage to fuel negative
emotions toward an outgroup, this does not inevitably mobilize their constituents
in support of conflict against that group. Instead, various factors mediate between
group-based emotions and action tendencies. For example, Eran Halperin found
that people tend to become more supportive of aggression against an outgroup (1)
if they harbor entrenched negative sentiments toward that group revolving around
hatred; and (2) once they learn of an (actual or fictional) event that induces acute
anger directed at the same group.34 Entrenched hatred and acute anger combined
mobilize people much more powerfully than either emotion in isolation. In a simi-
lar vein, where ingroup members have long perceived the outgroup as posing a
threat, they “will be more attuned to threatening cues and will be more likely to
interpret individual events as threatening and as calling for a violent response.”35
Against this backdrop, leaders wanting to mobilize their constituents for conflict
often seek to influence their feelings toward the outgroup on both dimensions. On
the first dimension, this typically involves attempts to “construe the nature of self
and other in order to create appraisals of threat and hence legitimate hostility
against the outgroup. The Nazi portrait of Jews as vermin, the Hutu extremist por-
trait of Tutsis as cockroaches [and] the Hindu nationalist portrait of Muslims as
cow killers” exemplify such entrenched negative group-based stereotypes.36 On the
second dimension, attempts to promote acute anger against an outgroup often cen-
ter on blaming the whole group for the anger-inducing actions of individual mem-
bers. Some nationalist movements in Europe routinely linking terrorist attacks by
Muslim extremists to some supposed character trait of the general Muslim popula-
tion exemplify such a generalization of blame. In other cases, behavior attributed
to the outgroup may be entirely fictional, such as in Nazi propaganda films depict-
ing “Aryan” Germans being victimized by conspiring Jews. Whichever strategy
elites choose, it is often at the point where the long-term buildup of negative ster-
eotypes intersects with a dramatic anger-inducing event that belligerent elites man-
age to turn latent hostility toward an outgroup into full-scale violence. The
genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda is a poignant example. The
mass killing was sparked by the shooting down of Rwandan president Juvenal
Habyarimana’s plane in 1994 but occurred on the back of a long campaign of Tutsi
dehumanization through mass media and other means.37
Yet even where hatred and anger combine, their effect may be tempered by other
factors. Hatred, anger, and feelings of humiliation tend to trigger inwardly directed res-
ignation rather than outwardly projected aggression if ingroup members perceive the
34Eran Halperin, “The Emotional Roots of Inter-Group Aggression: The Distinct Roles of Anger and Hatred,” in Human
Aggression and Violence: Causes, Manifestations, and Consequences, ed. Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer (Wash-
ington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2010): 315–32.
35Halperin, “The Emotional Roots of Inter-Group Aggression.”
36Reicher, Spears, and Haslam, “The Social Identity Approach,” 57.
37Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
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outgroup superior to the point of rendering the ingroup impotent.38 Fear may have a
similar constraining effect. In line with SIT, people are more likely to rally against out-
groups if they believe that these groups pose an acute threat to the ingroup. For exam-
ple, in the United States, public support for USmilitary involvement abroad is typically
highest if citizens judge it necessary to avert a direct threat to the United States.39 Such
threat perceptions involve fear. Yet studies found that fear by itself may dissuade group
members fromwanting to challenge the fear-instilling outgroup unless they expect their
group to win, in which case their fear has in a sense been eclipsed by confidence.40
Where fear outweighs confidence it tends to paralyze rather than mobilize, which also
would seem to explain why scaremongering alone rarely serves as an effective mobiliza-
tion strategy.41
When seeking to mobilize citizens for conflict with an outgroup, diversion-
ary leaders therefore must perform delicate balancing acts. While they need to
convince their constituents that the outgroup is strong enough to pose a real-
istic threat to the ingroup, they at the same time tend to portray the outgroup
as inferior and facing likely defeat. Here again, former president Milosevic is a
good example. From the late 1980s onwards, his attempts to mobilize Serbs in
support of conflict with their neighbors revolved around cultivating a sense of
Serb victimization and humiliation at the hands of various ougroups (Mus-
lims, Croats, the EU, etc.). Simultaneously, the Serb leader overlaid these vic-
timization and humiliation themes with a chauvinistic nationalism that hailed
Serbia’s supposed superiority over its neighbors.42 As argued below, President
Putin’s depiction of Russia as the victim of a sneaky and aggressive yet degen-
erate West reflects a similar mixing of the themes of danger, victimhood,
strength, and superiority.
Yet, even where leaders manage to rally their constituents in support of conflict
and through this strengthen their attachment to the group, this does not inevitably
rally the public behind their rule. As was suggested, whether increased group iden-
tification transfers to leaders depends in part on how strongly they are “fused” to
their group and thus also on the political system in which they operate. Moreover,
as the next section shows, it also depends on how leaders position themselves
domestically in relation to the conflict.
38Halperin, “The Emotional Roots of Inter-Group Aggression;” Bernhard Leidner, Hammad Sheikh, and Jeremy Ginges,
“Affective Dimensions of Intergroup Humiliation,” PLoS One 7 no. 9 (September 2012): e46375. However, the direc-
tion of causality here is not clear. When ingroup members believe that their group is stronger than the outgroup,
their anger at that group and their support for acting against it typically increase. See Mackie, Devos, and Smith,
“Intergroup Emotions.”
39John R. Oneal and Anna Lillian Bryan, “The Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1985,”
Political Behavior 17, no. 4 (December 1995): 379–401; John R. Oneal, Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner, Jr., “Are the
American People ‘Pretty Prudent?’ Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950–1988,” International Studies Quarterly
40, no. 2 (June 1996): 261–79; Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal, “Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opin-
ion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 277–300.
40Cheung-Blunden and Blunden, “The Emotional Construal of War,” 132, et seq.
41Ibid., 147.
42Dusan Kecmanovic, The Mass Psychology of Ethnonationalism (London: Kluwer, 1996); Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia.
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Perceptions and Positioning of the Leader
Diversionary leaders seeking to use a conflict to rally public support for themselves
may do so in two main ways. First, conflict typically allows leaders to present
themselves in various group-protecting and group-defending roles that strengthen
their perceived “fusion” with the group—meeting wounded soldiers, awarding
bravery medals, visiting civilians in air raid shelters, appealing for national unity in
televised addresses to the nation, and so forth.43 The potential of conflict to tie
leaders to their groups in this way is especially strong since during national emer-
gencies domestic opponents often desist from criticizing the leader and from ques-
tioning her or his motives. Furthermore, group members tend to experience
(especially violent) conflict both intensely and over protracted periods. This creates
a combination of impact and length of exposure, both of which promote the inter-
nalization of emotional associations and the development of durable affective
dispositions.44
Second and parallel to this, leaders may instrumentalize a conflict to further
amplify their constituents’ experience of positive group-based emotions as well as
the extent to which these emotions become associated with their rule. To that end,
they may frame the conflict and their role in it in terms of familiar historical tem-
plates that for their part are already positively charged.45 For example, overwhelm-
ing public support in Britain for the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 and rising
support for (the hitherto unpopular) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were in
part driven by several mass-circulation popular newspapers persistently covering
the war through the lens of Winston Churchill fighting Nazi aggression and of
Thatcher as the archetypical embodiment of British grit and resilience.46 Such
highly personalized associations and comparisons transformed the conflict into a
perceived rerun of a positively charged experience with Thatcher at the helm.
Whether leaders can cultivate such associations obviously depends, among other
things, on the availability of suitable historical templates, on their personality, and
on the support they enjoy among opinion multipliers.
In a similar vein, leaders may seek to frame conflict-related events in a way that
converts negative emotions (such as fear and doubt) into positive emotions (such
as confidence, solidarity, and resolve) while placing themselves at the center of this
emotional “conversion” process. For example, President George W. Bush’s popu-
larity rose by around forty percentage points after the September 11 attacks. Yet as
James N. Schubert and his collaborators’ detailed tracing of public sentiments
from the immediate aftermath of the attacks shows, the surge in Bush’s approval
43This accords with findings that foreign policy crises tend to generate little additional support for US presidents
unless they receive prominent media coverage that portrays them as central protagonists spearheading a decisive
response to the crisis. See Oneal and Bryan, “The Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect.”
44Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11,” International Organization 69, no. 4 (Fall 2015),
855.
45Reicher, Haslam, and Hopkins, “Social Identity and the Dynamics of Leadership,” 561.
46Robert Harris, Gotcha!: The Media, the Government, and the Falklands Crisis (London: Faber and Faber, 1983).
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ratings was not caused by the attacks themselves, whose primary effect was to
instill fear and confusion.47 What instead ignited Bush’s rise in popularity was his
rhetorical response to the atrocities, encapsulated by his carefully calibrated televi-
sion address on the evening of September 11. Though Bush arguably had no diver-
sionary intentions, his appearance “triggered a rally effect [around the president]
by presenting Bush to the nation in an appropriate leadership role, reassuring the
nation of the government’s stability and capacity to function, while committing
the nation to a forceful, retaliatory response to the attacks.”48 Long before his
administration had decided on its political and military response to the atrocities,
Bush’s rhetoric helped to convert public fear and confusion into a (however fragile)
sense of continuity and reassurance.
As Lloyd Cox and Steve Wood argue, the killing of Osama bin Laden by US
forces in 2011 benefitted President Barack Obama in analogous ways, though he,
too, had no obvious diversionary motive. Obama’s somber address to the nation
after the killing, in which he recalled bin Laden’s atrocities and claimed that justice
had been served, was complemented by images depicting Obama with his aides in
the White House Situation Room supervising the raid on bin Laden’s hideout in
real time. Beyond just emphasizing leadership, such depictions reinforced and
channeled the emotions bin Laden’s killing stimulated among the American public.
They helped Obama to convert anger, fear, and humiliation invoked by the mem-
ory of 9/11 into a shared sense of justice, revenge, resilience, and closure to
trauma.49 As argued below, President Putin’s framing of the Crimea annexation as
symbolizing Russia’s transition from post-Cold War humiliation, victimization,
and betrayal to resurgent strength and self-assertion represented a similar effort to
transform negative into positive group-based emotions and to personify that shift.
In these and other examples, conflict can increase popular support for leaders if
their words and actions have the “emotional effects on public opinion of quelling
fears while instilling confidence and efficacy in the political response…. Simulta-
neously, the response should stimulate positive feelings of reassurance, hope, and
enthusiasm.”50
Finally, group-based perceptions and emotions “can create their own dynamics
or spirals of action and reaction”51 across group boundaries, making the conditions
discussed in this and the previous subsection subject to various interaction effects.
Where hostility between two groups is entrenched, leaders on one or both sides
find it relatively easy to frame the other group in such a way as to induce support
for aggression and thus aggravate long-term mutual hostility still further. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a frequently invoked example of entrenched negative
47James N. Schubert, Patrick A. Stewart, and Margaret Ann Curran, “A Defining Presidential Moment: 9/11 and the Rally
Effect,” Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (September 2002): 559–83. Also see Hall and Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11.”
48Schubert, Stewart, and Curran, “A Defining Presidential Moment,” 578.
49Cox and Wood “‘Got him,’” 127.
50Schubert, Stewart, and Curran “A Defining Presidential Moment,” 565.
51Neta C. Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy,” International Theory 6, no. 3
(November 2014): 548.
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perceptions facilitating regular flare-ups of violence while being further reinforced
by them.52 Conversely, where long-term perceptions between two groups are
largely positive, their leaders tend to refrain from diversionary belligerence, which
then further solidifies benign mutual attitudes and makes it even harder and less
likely for leaders to mobilize their publics in support of conflict. The diversionary
conflict literature has not systematically explored such interaction effects and
doing so would go beyond the scope of this article. However, an interaction per-
spective could help address puzzles such as the far-reaching absence of diversion-
ary violence (accompanied by the absence of other forms of violence) in
democratic dyads,53 which coincides with generally trusting mutual perceptions
among their mass publics.54 Diversionary conflicts and their enabling conditions
may constitute as well as de-constitute each other over time.
Rallying Around Russia and Putin: Public Opinion and the Crimea Conflict
This second part of the article applies the two SIT-deduced processes modeled in
the first part to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, assessing how the annex-
ation affected national identifications and public support for President Putin. To
do so, it treats the two proposed processes as the basis for two respective
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). This hypothesis states that conflict with an outgroup can
cause people to identify more strongly with the ingroup.
Applied to the Crimea conflict, if H1 holds we would expect the conflict to have
been accompanied by strengthening national identifications and growing ingroup
pride among Russians. In parallel, we would expect the Crimea conflict to have
worsened attitudes toward Ukraine and the West since the conflict was primarily
in opposition to these two outgroups, and since a SIT-based framework suggests
that during conflict positive ingroup and negative outgroup perceptions become
mutually reinforcing. If the matching null hypothesis holds, we would find no sig-
nificant change in national identifications resulting from the conflict.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). This second hypothesis states that where group attachments
strengthen, these can become channeled toward the leader and boost his or
her popularity.
Applied to the Crimea conflict, evidence for H2 would be in the form of
increased popular support for Putin. Because such support would derive from
intensifying national identifications and benefit Putin by virtue of him being per-
ceived as embodying the nation, we would expect it to outlast the immediate
52Halperin, “The Emotional Roots of Inter-Group Aggression.”
53John R. Oneal and Jaroslav Tir have shown that diversionary violence has been largely (though not fully) absent in
democratic dyads, matched by a strong general culture of mutual nonviolence. John R. Oneal and Jaroslav Tir, “Does
the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate
Conflict, 1921–2001,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 2006): 755–79.
54Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science
Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–65.
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context of the Crimea annexation and to extend to Putin’s policies beyond the Cri-
mea conflict itself. The matching null hypothesis states that group identification
does not affect support for the leader. According to the null hypothesis, even if the
Crimea conflict increased national identifications (as per H1), support for Putin
would have remained unaffected by this. To the extent that the annexation none-
theless boosted support for Putin, this would have stemmed exclusively from fac-
tors other than a projection of national attachments onto the Russian president,
for example, from the annexation diverting public attention from domestic prob-
lems and/or from the public admiring Putin’s handling of the annexation. Such
support, however, would likely be volatile (tied to the specific event of the Crimea
annexation) and could be eroded relatively easily by countervailing factors such as
the experience of economic hardship resulting from the conflict.
If the argument in this article is correct, the Crimea conflict had several dimen-
sions that made it prone to strengthen both national sentiments and support for
President Putin. As is shown below, over many years prior to the annexation Putin
had sought to “fuse” his personae with nationalist themes and symbols. Moreover,
the Russian mass media’s framing of the annexation consistently emphasized
national themes while placing Putin’s personae center stage. If, in light of these
presumably favorable scope conditions, the Crimea conflict turned out not to have
affected group identification and attitudes toward Putin as predicted by the two
hypotheses, the social-psychological logic outlined in this article would likely be
flawed or at least in need of further specification. Moreover, that same logic would
be unlikely to apply to conflicts whose scope conditions appear less conducive to it
than did those in Russia at the time of the Crimea annexation.55 If, by contrast, it
became evident that the Crimea conflict did enhance national identifications, and
through this support for Putin, this would back the article’s theoretical argument
while illustrating how the social-psychological processes outlined can manifest
themselves in a real-world scenario. In that sense, the Crimea conflict serves to
empirically test and, potentially, to illustrate the article’s theoretical claims.
The section begins by briefly discussing Putin’s efforts to “nationalize” his lead-
ership prior to the annexation. It then ascertains how the Crimea seizure, Putin’s
rhetorical framing of it, and Russia’s ensuing standoff with Ukraine and the West
affected national sentiments and popular attitudes towards Putin. Both developed
in ways consistent with H1 and H2 respectively.
Putin’s Positioning: From the “Nationalist Turn” to the Crimea Annexation
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which began in late February 2014, followed sus-
tained efforts by Putin to embrace policies, rhetoric, and symbolic gestures with a
broadly national and nationalist slant. These had origins in the early years of
55See Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (April 2006):
226.
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Putin’s reign but gained added momentum after the anti-Putin street protests of
2011–12 and his government’s relatively poor showing in the parliamentary elec-
tions in December 2011. Surveys suggested that much of this opposition to Putin
emanated from a broadly defined nationalist political spectrum,56 which many of
Putin’s post-election policies seemed designed to appease.
Enthusiastically backed by a largely Putin-friendly mass media and various
Kremlin-sponsored youth movements and civic organizations, Putin’s nationalist
reorientation encompassed an eclectic mix of rhetoric, symbolic gestures, and pol-
icy initiatives at home and abroad. Many of these were predicated on claims that
the West had betrayed post-Soviet Russia and that this justified Russia adopting a
more confrontational stance. As encapsulated in Putin’s landmark Munich speech
of 2007, such grievances had been fueled notably by NATO’s enlargement into
Central Europe and by alleged US attempts to forge a unipolar world order
through its policies in the Middle East and elsewhere.57 In addition, the Russian
government became increasingly outspoken against several former Soviet repub-
lics, accusing them of maltreating Russian-speaking minorities. Concerns for what
it had started to refer to as “compatriots abroad”58 (some of whom were granted
Russian citizenship) evolved into a central theme for the Russian government,
which used them notably to justify its military intervention in South Ossetia in
August 2008 and the war with Georgia it ignited. Referring to the conflict, Presi-
dent Dmitry Medvedev (Putin was prime minister at the time59) proclaimed it his
government’s “duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever
they may be.”60
These themes of threat and confrontation accompanied a growing official
emphasis on Russia’s social and cultural distinctiveness and an increasingly viru-
lent rejection of Western-style liberal democracy as a worthy model for Russia to
emulate. Underscoring its growing self-demarcation from the liberal West, Putin’s
government fashioned closer links with the socially conservative Russian Orthodox
Church while stepping up persecution of critical artists, NGOs, and sexual minori-
ties, often accusing them of subversion and of acting as Western agents. Rhetori-
cally, meanwhile, Kremlin officials, pro-Putin public intellectuals and the state-
56Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield, “Forward to Democracy or Back to Authoritarianism? The Attitudinal Bases of
Mass Support for the Russian Election Protests of 2011–2012,” Post-Soviet Affairs 29, no. 5 (June 2013): 387–403.
57“Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” President of Russia Official Web-
site, 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
58Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Russia: Introduction to the Special Issue,” in “Between Nationalism,
Authoritarianism, and Fascism in Russia: Exploring Vladimir Putin’s Regime,” ed. Taras Kuzio, special issue, Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 1 (March 2016): 1–11; Lilia Shevtsova, “Forward to the Past in Russia,” Journal of
Democracy 26, no. 2 (April 2015): 22–36; Valerie Sperling, “Putin’s Macho Personality Cult,” in Kuzio, “Between
Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and Fascism in Russia,” special issue, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 1
(March 2016): 13–23; Stefan Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis and the Return of Geopolitics,”
International Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2015): 953–68.
59Faced with presidential term limits, Putin had moved to the office of prime minister in 2008 but swapped posts with
Medvedev again four years later.
60“Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia,” President of Russia Official Website, 8 August 2008, http://en.kremlin.
ru/events/president/transcripts/1042.
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controlled media depicted Western Europe as a repellent social model in decline,
in the thralls of excessive individualism, runaway materialism, moral relativism,
and homosexuality, while lacking the strength and character to free itself from US
domination.61 As one commentator observed, what these various policies and por-
trayals aimed for was to construct Russia not as a society apart from Europe so
much as an embodiment of “the True Europe, while Western Europe is a corrupted
version occupied, influenced, and suborned by the United States.”62
Throughout Putin’s reign, the Russian mass media became subjected to steadily
tightening formal and informal state control.63 Its coverage of the government
became more homogenously supportive and more strongly focused on Putin him-
self, an emphasis that became especially strong during the war with Georgia in
2008.64 Representations of Putin as defender and protector of the nation were visu-
ally reinforced by a continuous stream of media images of Putin in martial,
“manly,” and “patriotic” poses—brandishing rifles on hunting expeditions, piloting
fighter jets, inspecting military maneuvers in combat uniform, flooring opponents
during martial arts sessions, and bare-chested on horseback riding through the
Russian steppes. While such poses were widely derided abroad, the message con-
veyed to Putin’s domestic audience was relentless and unambiguous: Russia reas-
serting itself guided by a powerful and respected leader, and a “communal
outpouring of love and appreciation for Putin, with a focus on his strength, patriot-
ism, and protection of Russia’s national interests.”65
None of this meant that Putin could jump on a preexisting nationalist frenzy,
anti-Western or otherwise. On the contrary, research consistently showed that
post-Soviet Russian identity was relatively weak, fragmented, and demoralized.66
What Putin rather appeared to aim for was the partial (re)construction of post-
Soviet Russian national identity in his own image: it was as much about “national-
izing” Putin as it was about “Putinizing” national sentiments. These efforts
appeared to resonate with a broader Russian public from relatively early on. As far
back as the middle of the last decade, surveys indicated that a growing number of
Russians were defining their leader in terms of the very characteristics his policies,
pronouncements, and publicity campaigns sought to convey: as a tough and manly
defender of the nation against its enemies at home and abroad.67
61Kevin Moss, “Russian Occidentalism: Gayropa and Russia’s Traditional Values” (paper presented at the 4th European
Conference on Politics and Gender, Uppsala, Sweden, 11–13 June 2015); Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin.”
62Ted Hopf, “‘Crimea is Ours’: A Discursive History,” International Relations 30, no. 2 (June 2016): 235.
63Shevtsova, “Forward to the Past,” esp. 30–33. Most critically, this applied to television, which is by far the most
important source of news and current affairs for most Russians. Channel One’s news programs alone are watched by
82 percent of the population. Martin Russell, “Russsian Media—Under State Control,” European Parliamentary
Research Service PE 559.467 (May 2015).
64Lev Gudkov, “Putin’s Relapse into Totalitarianism,” in The State of Russia: What Comes Next? ed. Maria Lipman and
Nikolay Petrov (London: Palgrave, 2015), 86–109.
65Sperling, “Putin’s Macho Personality Cult,” 19; Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin.”
66Paul Goble, “Russian National Identity and the Ukrainian Crisis,” in Kuzio, “Between Nationalism, Authoritarianism,
and Fascism in Russia,” special issue, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 1 (March 2016): 37–41.
67Sperling, “Putin’s Macho Personality Cult,” 4.
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The Crimea annexation fit into this pattern of national assertiveness tailored
around President Putin. Taken from Russia and “gifted” to Ukraine by Khrush-
chev, the fate of the peninsula and its mainly Russian-speaking population had
long occupied Russian nationalists of various stripes and had become a set-piece
feature in the Kremlin’s “compatriots abroad” rhetoric over the preceding years.68
Russian resentments were further aggravated by widespread popular protests in
Ukraine throughout the winter of 2013–14 demanding democratic reforms and
closer ties with the European Union, and by the overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Rus-
sian president in February 2014. The Kremlin blamed both on Western efforts to
undermine Russia’s regional influence and to turn Ukraine into a client state of the
West.
Crimea’s return to Russia was swift. Taking advantage of Ukraine’s domestic
turmoil, Putin employed a “hybrid strategy” that began with an intensive pro-Rus-
sian media campaign targeting the Crimean population. This was followed on the
last day of February 2014 by Russian soldiers without insignia occupying strategic
locations across Crimea and subsequently by regular Russian troops consolidating
Russia’s hold over the territory.69 Two weeks later, a large majority of Crimeans
voted to join the Russian Federation in a Kremlin-backed referendum. At the earli-
est stages of the intervention Russia denied direct military involvement, but it was
clear that the Russian government was guiding events. After the referendum had
sealed Crimea’s return to Russia, pro-Kremlin media were quick to celebrate it as
one of Putin’s foremost patriotic achievements.70 At the same time, the annexation
threw Russia into a prolonged standoff with Ukraine and the West. It became
defined by tightening economic sanctions and counter-sanctions, and by ongoing
tensions in eastern Ukraine where the Ukrainian and Western governments
accused Putin of arming pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region with a view
to dismembering Ukraine still further.
Putin’s portrayal of the seizure slotted in seamlessly with the general national-
ism- and patriotism-centered themes that had marked his rule from the middle of
the preceding decade. They revolved around anger and a sense of betrayal at the
West’s alleged disrespectful meddling in Ukraine and elsewhere, mapped onto
long-lasting grievances over Russia’s post–Cold War loss of status and the fate of
“compatriots abroad.” These themes of humiliation and anger were mixed with
expressions of pride over the annexation, which was held up as a symbol of Rus-
sia’s national reawakening inexorably linked to Putin’s leadership. Putin developed
these themes extensively in a televised address on 18 March 2014 that marked Cri-
mea’s formal reincorporation into Russia.71 Adopting a tone that “mixes politics,
68Kuzio, “Nationalism and Authoritarianism;” Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin.”
69Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Kennan Cable 7 (April 2015), https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN CABLE-ROJANSKY KOFMAN.pdf; Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Krem-
lin,” 964.
70For an excellent analysis, see Sperling, “Putin’s Macho Personality Cult.”
71“Address by President [sic] of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia Official Website, 18 March 2014, http://en.
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
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national resentments and nationalism, all overlaid with a religio-mystical tone that
sounds, at times, almost messianic,”72 Putin proclaimed that everything in Crimea
was “symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valor.” Yet when the
Soviet Union collapsed, Crimea’s Russian-speaking majority joined many other
Russian speakers in various Soviet republics who “went to bed in one country
and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities … while
the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group
in the world to be divided by borders.” At that point, Russia realized “that it was
not simply robbed, it was plundered.” Russia’s humiliation, according to Putin,
was compounded by what he described as a Western-inspired coup against
Ukraine’s pro-Russian government, which he claimed had left the country in the
hands of “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites” bent on threat-
ening Russian-speakers in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine. Putin assured his
audience that Ukraine’s new rulers had already decided to pay back their masters
in the West by joining NATO and allowing NATO to move into Crimea. Had this
been allowed to happen, “NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s
military glory, and this would create … a perfectly real threat to the whole
of southern Russia.” “I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol
to visit NATO sailors.”73
In the same speech, Putin conceded that the Crimea annexation would make
Russia’s relations with the West more confrontational, equating potential Western
countermeasures with domestic opposition to his rule and thus, implicitly, his rule
with the Russian nation’s independence and resistance to foreign interference.
“Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but
also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would
like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this dis-
parate bunch of ‘national traitors,’ or are they hoping to put us in a worsening
social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent?” Yet Putin
assured his audience that with “the will of millions of our people, our national
unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces,” Russia’s
enemies would find that the nation could not be divided.74
In the months following the annexation and against the backdrop of mounting
international criticism and hardening economic sanctions, Putin’s rhetoric became
ever more dramatic. Addressing a meeting of Russian ambassadors, the president
claimed that “everything Russia has fought for since Peter the Great was threat-
ened” by the overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president.75 Meanwhile, Russian
media coverage continued to focus on Putin as the central protagonist in the Cri-
mea annexation and on the annexation itself as a symbol of national self-assertion
72Bob Dreyfuss, “Full Text and Analysis of Putin’s Crimea Speech,” Nation (online ed.), 19 March 2014, https://www.the
nation.com/article/full-text-and-analysis-putins-crimea-speech/.
73“Address by President [sic] of the Russian Federation,” 18 March 2014.
74Ibid.
75Quoted in Hopf, “‘Crimea is Ours,’” 247.
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and pride. In a documentary titled “Crimea: Way Back Home,” aired on the popu-
lar pro-Kremlin Rossiya 1 television network on the first anniversary of the annex-
ation, Putin offered an extensive account of his role in planning and supervising
the annexation and claimed that he would have placed nuclear weapons on alert to
defend Russia’s hold over Crimea had this become necessary.76 The documentary
and many other portrayals in the largely Putin-friendly Russian media rehearsed
the same set of basic themes discussed earlier: Russia and Russians had suffered
humiliation and disrespect and faced acute dangers (a Western-engineered coup in
Ukraine, threats to “compatriots abroad,” NATO eyeing Crimea, etc.); Russia had
successfully fought off these dangers and asserted itself against a sneaky and
treacherous West; and Crimea’s return to Russia corrected a historical wrong while
representing “a triumph of security planning and execution, with Mr. Putin at its
heart”77 —a leader who, according to his spokesman Dmitry Peskov, was now
“probably the main guarantor of the safety of the Russian world.”78 In all these
depictions relentlessly reiterated to the Russian public, the return of Crimea sym-
bolized the end of Russia’s post–Cold War humiliation and a resurgence of
national pride with Putin cast as presiding over and embodying this transforma-
tion, animated by the same virtues of strength, pride, and patriotism that his rheto-
ric conferred upon the Russian nation at large.
Effect on National Identifications (Hypothesis 1)
Survey data indicate that the Crimea annexation was extremely popular among the
Russian public. A spring 2014 Pew Research Center survey showed that 89 percent
of Russians welcomed Crimea’s return to Russia.79 Moreover, the seizure was fol-
lowed by significant increases in national pride and in general ingroup positivity
among Russians and by an even sharper worsening of perceptions of Ukraine and
the West. The share of respondents who professed a “very favorable” view of Rus-
sia soared from 29 percent in the spring of 2013 to 51 percent immediately follow-
ing the annexation one year later. It rose further to 63 percent the year after as
Russia’s standoff with Ukraine and the West hardened, Western sanctions tight-
ened, and the Kremlin’s defense of the annexation became ever more dramatic.80
Several related indicators compiled by Russia’s respected Levada Center point in
76The title of the documentary has been given various translations in English. A version with English subtitles is “Cri-
mea: Way Back Home,” YouTube video, 2:25:03, documentary originally televised on Rossiya 1 on 15 March 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?vDgDLs-Nq_xTc.
77Neil MacFarquhar, “Putin Says He Weighed Nuclear Alert over Crimea,” New York Times, 15 March 2015, https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/03/16/world/europe/putin-says-he-weighed-nuclear-alert-over-crimea.html?mcubzD0.
78Robert Coalson, “Putin Pledges to Protect All Ethnic Russians Anywhere. So, Where Are They?” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, 10 April 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.
html.
79Pew Research Center, “Despite Concerns about Governance, Ukrainians Want to Remain One Country,” 8 May 2014,
31.http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-coun
try/.
80Pew Research Center, “NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid,” 10 June
2015, 46. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-pro
vide-military-aid/.
THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSIONARY CONFLICT 21
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e D
ub
lin
] a
t 0
6:2
0 2
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
the same direction. The share of respondents satisfied with Russia’s level of
“national well-being” increased from 41 percent in November 2013 to 59 percent
in May 2014 following the annexation.81 The proportion of Russians who believed
that Russia was “moving in the right direction” likewise rose from 43 percent in
January 2014 to 60 percent immediately after the annexation in March 2014 and
remained at similarly high levels throughout 2015.82 For many Russians, the boost
in national self-esteem was so strong that they even projected it onto how they
thought foreigners perceived their country. Immediately after the annexation, 43
percent believed that it had improved Russia’s standing in the world, with only 27
percent sensing the opposite effect.83 Meanwhile, Russian perceptions of the West
deteriorated sharply during the same period. By early 2015 only 15 percent still
had a positive image of the United States (down from 51 percent two years earlier),
with perceptions of Germany, NATO and the European Union experiencing simi-
larly steep drops.84
Judged by these figures, the effect of the Crimea conflict on Russian national
sentiments broadly corresponds to the conflict–cohesion claim and its elaboration
by social identity theory and thus accords with H1. Extremely popular in its own
right, the Crimea annexation boosted ingroup pride among Russians and a sense
of collective optimism and well-being. Ingroup positivity intensified still further as
Russia became entangled in a sustained conflictual relationship with Ukraine and
the West and as Putin’s tone hardened. The simultaneous and sharp deterioration
in outgroup perceptions is in line with a SIT-style competitive social comparison
process as part of which outgroup negativity and ingroup positivity reinforce each
other. It was not only the annexation itself that appears to have boosted positive
ingroup emotions but also a perception among many Russians that their country
was holding its own in a standoff with parts of the outside world they viewed with
growing suspicion. Their increasingly hostile attitudes towards the West, soaring
levels of national pride, and their stated belief that Russia had regained respect in
the world suggests that the Russian public had largely absorbed its president’s
framing of the annexation. As did Putin’s rhetoric, public attitudes revealed a sense
of shared victimhood paired with feelings of regained national efficacy, self-asser-
tion, and pride.
Effect on Support for President Putin (Hypothesis 2)
Throughout the first eleven months of 2013, Putin’s approval ratings had remained
relatively stable. They started to rise sharply as the popular uprising against
81“3>*ekcZ >aP4o>a:\>o(o $:a(oBo:yR4b” (“Indices of National Welfare”), Levada Center, http://www.levada.ru/
indikatory/polozhenie-del-v-strane/.
82“?Pe>ka HekyVe(o Bo:o0e>4b *e: & cHpa>e” (“Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country”), Levada
Center, http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/polozhenie-del-v-strane/.
83This changed the subsequent year as economic sanctions made it obvious that much of the outside world judged
the annexation negatively. Pew Research Center, “NATO Publics Blame Russia,” 55.
84Ibid., 44–48.
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Ukraine’s pro-Russian president gained momentum and Russia’s stance towards
its neighbor hardened, from 61 percent in November 2013 to 69 percent in Febru-
ary 2014. They rose even more dramatically—from 69 to 80 percent—between
February and March 2014, coinciding with Russia’s military intervention in Cri-
mea and the territory’s return to Russia during that period. Support for Putin con-
tinued to climb to 88 percent in late 2014 as Russia’s suspected involvement in
eastern Ukraine exacerbated tensions with Ukraine and the West still further.85
Parallel to this, satisfaction with the Russian government’s performance in many
areas with no direct bearing on Ukraine or Crimea also rose sharply. This included
Putin’s perceived record in fighting corruption, in respecting personal freedoms
and in managing the economy.86 Growing approval of Putin’s economic perfor-
mance is especially remarkable, since over the same period Russians judged their
actual economic circumstances to have gone from bad to worse. By early 2015, 73
percent deemed the economy in a bad state (up 9 percent from 2013), reflecting a
shrinking GDP, rising inflation, and a collapse of the value of the Ruble on cur-
rency markets. Russia’s economic woes were clearly exacerbated by tightening
Western economic sanctions in response to the Crimea seizure and Russia’s sus-
pected support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. Despite this, only 25 percent of
Russians thought that Putin’s policies bore any responsibility for the economic
downturn.87
In sum, Russian public opinion in response to the Crimea annexation developed
in ways consistent with the article’s two SIT-derived hypotheses. The annexation
appeared to stimulate national pride and a sense of collective well-being among
Russians (H1) alongside a dramatic and sustained increase in President Putin’s
popularity (H2). Both intensified still further as Russia became entangled in a sus-
tained standoff with Ukraine and the West and faced mounting economic and
political pressure from abroad and as the Putin-allied mass media relentlessly
hailed the annexation as a symbol of Russia’s national revival inexorably linked to
Putin’s leadership. Having “fused” his personae to national themes and symbols
over the years prior, it appears that Putin successfully channeled the surge in
ingroup pride sparked by the annexation toward himself and thereby created a
diversionary effect.
Alternative Interpretations
The interpretation outlined over the previous pages might attract two objections.
First, the data presented allows for the possibility that the relationship between
85“?*o$pe>4e *ebHe:\>ocH4 %:a*4<4pa AyH4>a” (“Approval of President Putin’s Conduct”), Levada Center,
http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/. Gallup polling data found that immediately after the
Crimea annexation, 83 percent of Russians had confidence in Putin, up from 54 percent a year earlier. See Julie Ray
and Neli Esipova, “Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years,” Gallup, 18 July 2014, http://www.gal
lup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx.
86Pew Research Center, “NATO Publics Blame Russia,” 54–55.
87Ibid., 44, 54.
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soaring ingroup esteem and growing support for Putin could have operated in the
opposite direction: the highly popular annexation could have lifted support for
Putin, which then boosted group pride, given that Putin had sought to “fuse” him-
self with national symbols in the ways discussed. However, such a scenario does
not contradict my argument. If group and leader are partially “fused” one would
expect the relationship to work in both directions, with pride in one also augment-
ing pride in the other. Modeling a link from positive ingroup emotions to support
for the leadership as I have tried to do does not rule out that the relationship may
be bidirectional.
A second and potentially more serious objection is that the data presented are
logically consistent with an alternative scenario in which national pride and sup-
port for Putin increased independently of each other—the former driven by
ingroup/outgroup dynamics a la SIT (and in line with H1) but the latter by nothing
more than popular admiration for Putin’s handling of the highly popular annex-
ation. Yet several factors would seem to contradict such an interpretation. For a
start, support for Putin continued to climb long after the annexation had been
wrapped up successfully and thus probably beyond any direct boost Putin might
have received from his handling of it, but in parallel with rising levels of national
pride and worsening perceptions of Ukraine and the West. Second, Putin’s actual
policy performance at any rate does not appear to have been the sole criterion by
which Russians judged their leader. As was shown, after the Crimea seizure popu-
lar support for Putin’s policies soared even in areas that had no direct link to Cri-
mea or Ukraine and where objective conditions manifestly worsened, such as the
economy and civil liberties. What this implies is a kind of “reverse causality”
dynamic, which is in line with a social identity-centered interpretation captured by
H2. Having “fused” his leadership to national themes and symbols in the years
prior, the surge in national pride unleashed by the Crimea conflict also benefited
Putin and rubbed off on how Russians judged their leader’s performance across
the board. This surge in popular approval of Putin appeared to fuel growing sup-
port for his policies, not vice versa.
In its essence, such an interpretation is not new. It closely relates to what Rus-
sian sociologists and political scientists describe as a process of “negative mobiliza-
tion”—driven by a presumed interconnectedness of conflict, hostile perceptions of
the outside, national pride, and support for Putin’s leadership.88 Such a link was
already evident during previous conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia, both of which
boosted popular support for Putin significantly. The Crimea annexation has pro-
duced its strongest and most sustained manifestation to date. In the words of one
Russian political scientist: “By annexing Crimea and backing pro-Russian separa-
tists in eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin was able to justify its military-patriotic mobi-
lization of society and its transformation of Russia into a ‘besieged fortress.’ …
88For a detailed discussion, see Gudkov, “Putin’s Relapse.”
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Public mobilization around the leader and the motherland rose to a new pitch…
Individuals are invited to compensate for their helplessness by looking for meaning
in collective national ‘successes’ that promise to bring them together and restore
their pride. The annexation of Crimea has become such a ‘success,’ giving ordinary
Russians a chance to forget their woes and feel a surge of vicarious optimism.”89
None of this indicates whether Putin intervened in Crimea in order to enhance
his popularity, even though his framing of the conflict to his domestic audience
might hint at such an underlying motive. What the Crimea experience suggests
with greater certainty is that for as long as the Russian president remains “fused”
to national themes and symbols in a way that makes external conflict liable to
enhance his domestic position he will face a latent diversionary incentive. As the
Crimea annexation has demonstrated, even conflicts that reduce the quality of life
for most ordinary citizens can boost national attachments and support for the
leader and thereby produce a diversionary effect.
Countervailing Pressures and the Limits of Diversion
Diversionary conflict theorists assert that conflict between groups and states can
increase popular support for their leaders. This claim is counterintuitive, as it
implies that people choose to compromise their physical security and material wel-
fare by supporting to the very leaders who put these at risk. Relying on social iden-
tity theory, this article deduced an explanation for why and when conflict can
mobilize popular support for leaders. SIT offers a parsimonious yet powerful
social-psychological rationale for how conflict between groups can cause people to
identify more strongly with these groups and to experience positive ingroup emo-
tions and how this in turn can boost support for group leaders. SIT also highlights
the scope conditions under which these processes are most likely to gain momen-
tum. By dramatically boosting national pride and support for President Putin, Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea helps corroborate the article’s central argument.
Several questions flow from this account. First, the Crimea conflict, among
many others, shows that conflict can make people more attached to their group
and leader even when it exacts material sacrifice; indeed, for SIT the shared experi-
ence of hardship at the hands of outgroups can itself be a source of ingroup soli-
darity. Nonetheless, such an effect may not last indefinitely. As a conflict
intensifies and the suffering it imposes on citizens mounts, support for diversion-
ary leaders may gradually diminish and with it the conflict’s attractiveness as a
power-preservation strategy. Similarly, while for SIT the shared experience of
physical danger can make groups more cohesive (and thus potentially benefit lead-
ers), this effect, too, is bound to wane once individual self-preservation instincts
start to override loyalties to the group and leader. High desertion rates experienced
by some armies during war are one manifestation of this. While a conflict’s ferocity
89Shevtsova, “Forward to the Past,” 23–24.
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would appear to be the key determinant of how quickly warring groups reach these
tipping points, various social, political, and ideological background conditions
might also play a role and merit closer investigation by diversionary conflict
researchers.
Finally, the effect of political and economic sanctions against diversionary gov-
ernments requires further investigation. On the one hand, by making a conflict
even more costly to citizens, sanctions might bring it closer to the threshold
beyond which social identity mechanisms fail to override their individual self-
interest. On the other hand, sanctions might play into the hands of diversionary
leaders by further hardening their and their constituents’ conflictual posture
towards the outside world. Complicating matters even more, different types of
sanctions might have different effects, and this, too, might differ between different
kinds of conflicts, types of diversionary regimes, and stages in the conflict cycle.
The deductive logic this article has developed cannot answer such questions, but
it provides a basis for further empirical inquiry. By deepening our understanding
of how and why conflict can strengthen leaders and the conditions under which
this is most likely to happen, it has laid theoretical groundwork for further analyz-
ing diversionary conflicts as conflicts with distinct causes and inhibitors and a tra-
jectory of their own.
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